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EUROPEAN BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS IN THE AUSTRIAN FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Miia PARNAUDEAU1 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The Austrian theory mainly deals with analyzing the effects of an increased credit offer on 
productive structures. In this respect, we propose to link long-term growth cycles to various 
short-term interest rate gaps. Are European Business Cycles affected when a fall in the money 
market rate disrupts agents’ expectations of inflation?  
 Using the hypothesis that individual speculation is motivated by the difference 
between short-term real interest rates and their natural levels, we argue that Wicksellian 
interest rate gaps can account for a high proportion of long-term fluctuations in 4 European 
countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain). We present specific dating methods and filters 
used in order to distinguish between short-term and long-term growth cycles. The Wicksellian 
incentives we constructed are then significantly linked to long-term business fluctuations. 
Under the hypothesis of adaptive expectations of inflation, our results are enhanced.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Austrian Theory of Business Cycles analyzes credit circulation. According to Wicksell, 
markets can be strongly affected by a divergence between the short-term real interest rate and 
its natural level. And, under some conditions, this divergence can explain business cycle 
fluctuations. Within this framework, the natural interest rate is a cleared market real rate: it 
strikes a balance between investments and savings, leaving prices constant. In the sectors 
where they are settled, entrepreneurs measure this natural interest rate. A boom-bust cycle is 
then launched when the money market rate falls2, and its magnitude directly depends on how 
economic agents perceive this fall. Hence an appropriate definition for expectations is needed.  
 
However, no such credit boom is sustainable if it is not underpinned by real savings. During 
economic expansion, entrepreneurs develop new projects as they have easy access to credit. 
As lending expands, investment projects become riskier. This growing risk is followed by 
inflationary pressures, and commercial banks increase their lending rates. This credit 
restriction induces economic recession. Business cycles thus result from banks’ decisions. 
Their lending activity destabilizes the economy because it leads to excessive credit 
distribution3 and inflation.  
 
Using the hypothesis that individual speculation is motivated by the difference between the 
short-term real interest rate and its natural level, we argue that Wicksellian interest rate gaps 
can play a major role in the long-term business cycles of four European countries (Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain). In the first part of this paper, we present the specific dating methods 
and filters used in order to distinguish between short-term and long-term growth cycles 
(section 1). In the second part, we propose various indicators (using different expectations of 
inflation) for the long-term growth cycles of these four European countries (sections 2 and 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 This fall is generally explained by a more flexible monetary policy. See Wicksell (1898).  
3 According to Wicksell, this credit distribution goes beyond what real economic resources would permit in the 
same situation.  
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1. Duality of European Business Cycles  
 
In order to verify the presence of complete growth cycles on our samples, we used a Markov 
Chain initially proposed by Artis & Al. [2003]. Two types of growth cycles were then 
determined: a short-term growth cycle (3 years) and a long-term growth cycle (10 years).  
 
The short-term growth cycle is measured as GDP’s4 deviation from its short trend (this short 
trend is a Hodrick-Prescott filtered GDP with a smoothing parameter of 100=λ ). The 
relevance of this method lies in the value of the smoothing parameter: it depends on both 
economic and statistic criteria5.  
 
The long-term growth cycle is then measured as GDP’s deviation from its long trend (this 
long trend is a Hodrick-Prescott filtered GDP with a smoothing parameter of 7000=λ ). But 
it is also isolated from its short-term fluctuations (a Hodrick-Prescott filtered GDP with a 
smoothing parameter of 100=λ ).  
 
In the Euro zone (12), we were able to determine four short-term cycles (Figure 1). We then 
tested their correlation with changes in inventories. From 1991 to 1996, the correlation levels 
obtained are high (61% and 77%). This strong link between entrepreneurs’ stocks and short-
term business fluctuations could illustrate inventory movements during the Concertina effect. 
Unfortunately, from 1996 to 2004, the correlation levels are too low.  
 
Using national data, we were able to determine short-term growth cycles in most European 
countries, but they are too specific to be aggregated (Table 1). Here again, the correlation 
levels between national short cycles and inventories are too weak.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 GDP at constant prices, quarterly data, Eurostat. 
5See Bouthevillain (2002) for precisions. We tested Bouthevillain’s propositions: 7000=λ  for the long-term 
growth cycle and 100=λ  for the short-term growth cycle.  
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Figure 1. European Short-term Growth Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. European inventory cycles 
 Short-term cycle correlation with Euro zone short-term cycle (1991-2004) 
Kitchin cycles Lagging (1) Coinciding Leading (1) 
Austria* 0.96 0.996 0.95 
Germany* 0.95 0.99 0.94 
Belgium 0.78 0.80 0.43 
Spain No short cycle  
Finland 0.45 0.41 0.27 
France 0.60 0.86 0.68 
Italy No short cycle  
Portugal  No short cycle  
 
Long-term growth cycles (aggregated and national cycles) are however easily determined. 
Their correlation levels with gross capital formation are high. National “Investment” cycles 
are also highly synchronized (over 95%). Consequently, working with an aggregated 
investment cycle (at the Euro-zone 12 level) could make sense (Figure 2).  
 
These long-term Investment cycles seem better candidates to illustrate our proposition. In 
linking short-term interest rate gaps with long cycles, we attempt to measure the effects of 
increased credit offer on productive structures. 
 
                                                          
6Germany and Austria are two particular cases. In these countries, using a HP(100) is irrelevant. We extracted a 
[HP(160) – HP(100)] strip in order to get significant correlations. This means that short-term cycles are longer 
(about 4 years as against 3 in other countries). We then weighted correlations with a similar European short cycle 
(extracting the same strip). Correlations with the HP (100) extracted European cycle are null (Austria) and equal 
to 0.11 (Germany). 
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2. Inflationary incentives for European long-term growth cycles 
 
When the money market rate falls, economic agents are considered as reacting to this signal 
by adjusting their expectations. Here, agents are influenced by the difference between the real 
interest rate and the natural interest rate. Consequently, several authors7 retained this 
difference for analysis purposes.  The natural rate of interest is defined as an average of the 
real interest rates, taken over the business cycle’s length. It can also be estimated. The natural 
rate of interest is defined as a real rate, which corresponds to a balanced inflation level. It is 
also considered to correspond to the GDP’s potential growth rate. However, in Wicksell’s 
terms, this rate corresponds rather to a null inflation level, and is therefore a “cleared market” 
rate.  
 
These methods provide good tools for the European Central Bank, but here we are seeking to 
illustrate how fluctuations evolve when an interest rate fall disrupts agents’ expectations of 
inflation, according to Wicksell (1907 – b): 
 “Would it be at all possible for the banks to keep the rate of interest either higher or 
 lower than its normal level, prescribed by the simultaneous state of the average profit 
 on capital?”  
                                                          
7 See Mesonnier (2005) for a review. 
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Accordingly, we retain the difference between the money market rate and the real interest rate 
as a leading signal for European long-term growth cycles. This gap illustrates the inflationary 
tensions developed during the cumulative process. As Wicksell notes (1907)-b: 
 “There is no link between nominal rate and real rate, except precisely the effect on 
 prices, which would be caused by their difference”. 
 
In our framework, a fall in the money market rate ( 'ti ) induces a divergence between tr  and its 
natural level *nt . The economy’s initial state is a market cleared situation, where: 
*
ntatt tri ==−π   with 0=atπ , *ntt tri ==  (1) 
Where ti  stands for nominal rate, atπ  for expected inflation rate, tr  for short-term real 
rate, and *nt  for its natural level. 
 
When the money market rate falls, the real interest rate is drawn below its natural level. The 
increasing gap between the short-term real rate and the money market rate reveals all the 
inflationary tensions induced (and expected by economic agents): 
*'''
ntatt tri p=−π   Since tt ii <'  and atat ππ >'  , with 0=atπ  (2) 
 
Our attention is focused on the difference )( '' tt ri − . We argue that the expected inflationary 
tensions induced by a fall in the money market rate can be directly connected to long-term 
growth cycles. Two types of short-term real rates are then proposed.  
 
The first one is derived from a transformation of Taylor’s rule, and is an ex ante measure 
defined as:  
]5.0)(5.0[ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−=
t
tt
ttt
ea
tt y
yy
ir πππ (3) 
Where eattr stands for short-term real interest rate, ti  for 3-month money market rate, 
tπ  for the annual sliding inflation rate, π  for the inflation target (1.8%), and 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
t
tt
y
yy
for the relative output gap.  
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The Taylor[1993] rule8 has been widely used in empirical works. In relation (3), the real 
interest rate corresponds to a “balanced” inflation rate, and it is also directly dependent on 
GDP’s potential growth. In using this ex ante measure, we take the Central Bank’s behavior 
rule into account in our analysis. If economic agents rely on the Central Bank’s behavior to 
elaborate their plans, this “ex ante” real interest rate could be their benchmark. But the 
relative output gap used in this measure cannot be used to separate long-term growth cycles 
from short-term ones.  
 
Moreover, if economic agents are only focused on inflationary tensions, their benchmark 
could be the following real interest rate (supposing that they are perfectly able to measure tπ ): 
“Ex post” measure: epttt ri =−π  (4) 
 
Interest rate gaps )( eattt ri −  and )( eptt ri −  are then considered as leading long-term growth 
cycles. In order to verify this assumption, we weighted causal and correlative relations 
between these gaps and long-term fluctuations (at both steps of the cycles). Taylorian ex ante 
gaps )( eattt ri −  and Inflationary “ex post” gaps )( eptt ri −  are only assigned as leading 
indicators for long-term growth cycles if they unidirectionally cause9 them. If this is so, gaps 
forecast expansion and recession phases. They must also be negatively correlated to long-term 
growth cycles.  
 
In table 2, we can see that Taylorian gaps (except in Italy) do not unidirectionally cause long-
term business fluctuations. Spain is a particular case, because Granger’s causalities are 
bidirectional there. Italians would seem to be significantly influenced by the Central Bank’s 
behavior rule. If the relevance of the fixed values (0.5) in statement (3) can be discussed, we 
can suppose that in Germany, France and Spain, economic agents simply focus on 
inflationary tensions when constructing their plans. However, this result has to be confirmed 
by further investigations.  
 
                                                          
8 According to Mesonnier and Rennes (2004), NER 117, note 1, page 5. The Central Bank’s intervention rate of 
interest is tttt ogri 5,0)(5,0 +−++= πππ  where r  is the real interest rate, and og the relative output gap. 
9 There is unidirectional causality when we are able to verify that there is a Granger causal link from gap to 
Juglar cycle and no Granger causal link from Juglar cycle to gap. 
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Table 2. Granger causality between gaps and long-term growth cycles10 
1 Lag Granger unidirectional causality 
(from interest rate gap on Juglar cycle) when  tr is a: 
Taylor rate  (1) 
 Ex ante measure 
Short-term real rate (2)  
Ex post measure 
Germany No Yes 
France No Yes 
Spain No (bidirectional causality) Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
 
We adopted the generalized method of moments because ordinary least squares are not 
consistent (the estimator is biased and not convergent11). We limited the numbers of 
instruments to lagged endogenous values. A similar approach has been proposed by 
Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003). In their regressions, an investment ratio is regressed on 
deflated equity prices12, and on lagged output growth. In relation (5), the long-term growth 
cycle is dependent on its past value, and on a Taylorian interest rate gap. In relation (6), it is 
dependent on its past value, and on an inflationary gap: 
 
cribaJJ eattttt +−+= − )(1 (5) 
cribaJJ eptttt +−+= − )(1 (6) 
Where tJ  stands for long-term growth cycle, ti  for the money market rate, 
ea
ttr  for the 
Taylorian interest rate, eptr  for the “ex post” real interest rate, and c for a constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 We also confirmed a negative correlation between Inflationary gaps and business cycles: This implies a 
decrease in the interest rate gap during economic expansion and its increase during economic recessions.   
11 Mesonnier et Rennes (2004).  
12 We do not introduce deflated equity prices in our Inflationary gaps, although it is possible. When they are 
taken into account, they have major consequences on the types of expectations elaborated by individuals. See 
Parnaudeau (2007).  
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Estimating relations (5) and (6) with GMM gives relevant results (Table 3), except for 
Germany. In that country, interest rate gap (5) is not significant. When the real rate is an ‘ex 
post’ rate (6), it is only significant at a 17% level. These interest rate gaps are not relevant 
explanative variables for Germany’s long-term growth cycles. In the Italian case, the best 
indicator for long-term fluctuations is constructed with a Taylorian gap. In Italy, the long-
term growth cycle is more reactive to monetary policy than in other countries.  In France and 
Spain, the most accurate gap is constructed with an “ex post” real rate. In these countries, 
inflationary tensions are a significant factor leading long-term growth cycles.  
 
Table  3. GMM regressions – Period (1991:01; 2004:04) 
Statement Real rate used: a b c 2R  J I13 
(5) ea
ttr 14 
Germany  99.6215 
(0.000) 
1.13 
(0.261) 
2.86 
(0.006) 
0.9861 0.17 11 
France 91.24 
(0.000) 
- 5.5993 
(0.000) 
0.97 
(0.333) 
0.9949 0.18 11 
Spain 231.36 
(0.00) 
-8.32 
(0.000) 
5.38 
(0.000) 
0.9983 0.18 11 
Italy 99.74 
(0.000) 
-2.71 
(0.009) 
7.00 
(0.000) 
0.9899 0.11 11 
(6) ep
tr  16 
Germany   106.76 
(0.000) 
-1.44 
(0.17) 
5.28 
(0.00) 
0.9888 0.15 11 
France 100.05 
(0.00) 
-3.19 
(0.00) 
-4.91 
(0.00) 
0.9917 0.14 11 
Spain 283.17 
(0.00) 
-7.92 
(0.00) 
5.67 
(0.00) 
0.9980 0.19 11 
Italy 91.65 
(0.00) 
2.26 
(0.02) 
6.89 
(0.00) 
0.9897 0.14 11 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Number of instruments. Below 4 lags, our results are not improved. See Greene (2000).  
14 This rate contains short-term fluctuations.  
15 T-statistic, with its probability in brackets. 
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3. Introducing adaptive and rational expectations of inflation 
 
In Wicksell’s analysis of business fluctuations, the cumulative process is dependent on 
agents’ expectations. They are considered as reacting to a fall in money market rate by 
modifying their expectations. But they are unable to measure its effective scope for the 
economy as a whole. Within this framework, agents’ expectations are dependent on  
information from past periods17.  
 
Individuals make adaptive forecasts (on the lending rate, and on the inflation level): future 
prices are expected to evolve in the same way and proportion as during the past period. The 
cumulative process depends directly on how agents perceive falls in the money market rate, 
and the inflationary tensions induced. As the forecasts they make are adaptive, a cumulative 
process is developed. In order to take these expectations into account, we propose the 
following ex ante real interest rate: 
“Ex ante” measure: att
ea
t ir π−=  (7) 
 
Two kinds of expected inflation18 atπ  are then used. In accordance with Wicksell’s findings, 
we constructed a first measure for eatr  based on adaptive expectations. For comparison 
purposes, we also used a real interest rate based on rational expectations. When the expected 
inflation level atπ  is adaptive, it is defined using the current inflation rate for the past period. 
When atπ  is considered as being rational, it is calculated as an average of current inflation 
levels.  
 
In Table 4, under the rational expectations assumption, the causal link between interest rate 
gaps and French long-term business cycles is bidirectional. For Germany, we noted a  
unidirectional link in both cases, but it seems stronger under the rational expectations 
assumption. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 Current inflation deflated rate or ex post real rate. 
17 For further comments, see Blaug. 
18 Under the rational expectations hypothesis, players are not (on average) considered as making mistakes. Under 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis, players are unable to forecast future events correctly; they can make errors.  
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Table 4. Introducing expectations in Inflationary gaps 
 )( eatt ri − // 
Juglar 
Granger causality when expectations ( atπ ) are: 
Rational Adaptive 
The gap does 
not cause the 
cycle 
The cycle does 
not cause the 
gap 
The gap does 
not cause the 
cycle 
The cycle does 
not cause the gap 
Germany 7.3719 
(0.00934) 
0.00022 
(0.98822) 
5.2814 
(0.02615) 
0.91551 
(0.34366) 
France 29.9477 
(1.9E-06) 
3.42 
(0.07099) 
32.39 
(8.4E-07) 
1.146 
(0.28986) 
Spain 5.51083 
(0.02336) 
1.91377 
(0.17337) 
6.8552 
(0.01193) 
0.75206 
(0.39033) 
Italy 6.7084 
(0.01289) 
0.02560 
(0.8736) 
7.503 
(0.00873) 
0.04224 
(0.83806) 
 
In Spain and Italy, unidirectional causalities are improved when expectations are adaptive. 
The interest rate gaps constructed under this assumption are better signals for French, Spanish 
and Italian long-term growth cycles20. However, it is difficult to identify an indicator for those 
long-term business cycles, because GMM estimations (Table 5) give really close results.  
 
This can be explained by the strict price stability targets in European countries, over our 
working period. The low volatility of inflation made the expected inflation levels atπ  really 
similar. It would seem advisable to retain relation (9) as a good indicator for long-term growth 
cycles: explanative variables are more significant, and 2R  are improved. Even for Germany, 
relation (9) is more accurate. These results highlight a need to assess precisely what kinds of 
forecasts are made in European countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 F-statistic, with its probability in brackets.  
20 This would seem to support the existence of an Inflationary cumulative process in those countries. 
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Table 5. Introducing expectations  
Statement a b c 2R  J Instruments 
(number) 
(8) Under rational expectations    cribaJJ eartttt +−+= − )(1  
Germany  122.6821 
(0.00) 
-1.83 
(0.07) 
7.18 
(0.00) 
0.9905 0.14 11 
France 84.66 
(0.00) 
-7.34 
(0.00) 
3.96 
(0.00) 
0.9919 0.16 11 
Spain 239.09 
(0.00) 
-6.77 
(0.00) 
5.45 
(0.00) 
0.9984 0.18 11 
Italy 105.66 
(0.00) 
-3.52 
(0.00) 
8.88 
(0.00) 
0.9891 0.11 11 
(9) Under adaptive expectations    cribaJJ eantttt +−+= − )(1  
Germany   123.7343 
(0.00) 
-2.11 
(0.04) 
6.94 
(0.00) 
0.9909 0.13 11 
France 132.4967 
(0.00) 
-5.48 
(0.00) 
-3.62 
(0.00) 
0.9951 0.16 11 
Spain 235.52 
(0.00) 
-6.79 
(0.00) 
6.23 
(0.00) 
0.9984 0.16 11 
Italy 76.72 
(0.00) 
-2.5458 
(0.01) 
6.01 
(0.00) 
0.9896 0.11 11 
 
Using a simplified specification of Nerlove’s model22, we searched for the kinds of 
expectations established by economic agents. In the following relation, expected inflation is 
dependent on past period’s inflation, and on lagged expected inflation: 
    att
a
t 11 )1( −− −+= πγγππ  (10) 
Where atπ stands for expected inflation, 1−tπ  for past inflation, and at 1−π  for lagged 
expected inflation.  
                                                          
21 T-statistic, with its probability in brackets. 
22 Nerlove (1956). We have not developed the eventuality of adjustment costs .  
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Within this framework, if γ =0, economic agents do not use past inflation to elaborate their 
plans. If 1=γ , individuals make adaptive forecasts, because they expect that prices at t will 
equal prices at 1−t .   
 
We used the prospects for agents’ prices proposed by the European Commission23 as a 
measure for at 1−π . In accordance with Nerlove’s proposition, we sought to check whether 
agents were making adaptive forecasts for inflation (Table 6, first relation tested). But we also 
tested whether agents were making rational forecasts for inflation (Table 6, second relation). 
We confirmed adaptive expectations (1 lag, a – coefficient is significant)24 in Germany, 
France, and Spain, but not in Italy. In Italy, expectations are totally disconnected from actual 
price variations. 
Table 6. Kinds of expectations in European countries: GMM regressions 
 
 (1991 – 2004) 
Countries 
 
European 
Commission 
Indicator 
a b 2R  J Instruments 
(number) 
Adaptive inflation expectations if att
a
t ba 11 −− Δ+Δ=Δ πππ  
Germany Confirmed 
Weak 
Confirmed 
Rejected 
1.85 (0.06) 87.33 (0.00) 0.83 0.04 7 
France 2.15 (0.03) 7.96 (0.00) 0.33 0.13 7 
Spain 2.62 (0.01) 19.70 (0.00) 0.77 0.10 7 
Italy -0.25 (0.80) 34.02 (0.00) 0.93 0.08 7 
Adaptive inflation expectations if att
a
t ba 1−Δ+Δ=Δ πππ  
Germany  Rejected 
Weak 
Rejected 
Rejected 
1.47 (0.14) 97.51 (0.00) 0.82 0.06 8 
France 2.85 (0.00) 5.96 (0.00) 0.30 0.12 8 
Spain 0.80 (0.42) 22.61 (0.00) 0.77 0.13 8 
Italy -0.00 (0.99) 41.63 (0.00) 0.92 0.10 8 
MMG 
(1996 – 2004) 
France 
French Central 
Bank indicator 
a b 2R  J Instruments 
(number) 
Adaptive inflation expectations if att
a
t ba 11 −− Δ+Δ=Δ πππ  
Confirmed 4.51 (0.00) 8.70 (0.00) 0.66 0.14 7 
Rational inflation expectations if att
a
t ba 1−Δ+Δ=Δ πππ  
Confirmed 4.34 (0.00) 6.92 (0.00) 0.64 0.16 7 
                                                          
23 Public opinion surveys on price expectations for the 12 next months, DataStream. 
24 Adding further lags in GMM regressions did not improve our results. 
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For France, the adaptive expectations assumption can be retained (we used two different 
indicators). French GMM regressions are however very close, but French inflation showed the 
lowest levels of fluctuations. For Germany, agents’ expectations seem adaptive rather than 
rational (first relation, Table 6). The most accurate indicators for long-term growth cycles are 
presented in Table 7. For Germany, we retained relation (9):  the interest rate gap used there 
as an explanative variable for long-term growth cycles is based on adaptive expectations of 
inflation.  
 
The best leading indicator for the French long cycle is (9), but (8) and (6) are also relevant. 
For Spain, as adaptive expectations were confirmed, the most accurate indicator for the long-
term growth cycle is (9). Finally, in Italy, as agents expectations are totally disconnected from 
current inflation rates, we selected (5) as the most accurate indicator.  
 
Table 7. Final Results25 
 
 
Country 
Granger causality between gaps and 
growth cycles, when gap is: 
Leading indicators for 
growth cycles: 
Expectations 
)( eattt ri −
 
)( eptt ri −
 
)( eartt ri −
 
)( eantt ri −
 
(5) 
T 
(6) 
EP 
(8) 
R 
(9) 
A 
R A 
Germany -  (u.c) -  (u.c) - - - X - X 
France -  (u.c)  (b.c)  (u.c) - X X X X X 
Spain  (b.c)  (u.c) -  (u.c) X X - X - X 
Italy (u.c)  (u.c) - - X - - - - - 
 
                                                          
25 u.c = unidirectional causality b.c = bidirectional causality, X = indicator settled, R = rational expectations, A = 
adaptive expectations, T = Taylorian interest rate gap, EP = Ex post interest rate gap.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In order to put forward some Austrian prospects for European Business Cycles, we 
constructed various interest rate gaps. Using the hypothesis that individual speculation is 
motivated by the difference between short-term real interest rates and their natural levels, we 
argued that Inflationary interest rate gaps can account for a high proportion of long-term 
fluctuations in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain). 
 
As European fluctuations are divided into short-term growth cycles (lasting about 3 years) 
and long-term growth cycles (lasting about 10 years), we selected specific filters and dating 
methods. Then, using Granger causal tests and GMM regressions, we selected the most 
accurate indicators for long-term growth cycles. 
 
In Germany, France and Spain, the most accurate indicator for long cycles is based on the 
assumption that economic agents are making adaptive forecasts for inflation. In Italy, 
expectations are totally disconnected from current inflation levels: expectations are not 
adaptive or rational. However, we were able to confirm a strong causal link between a 
Taylorian interest rate gap and long-term Italian growth cycles: Italians seem to be focused on 
the European Central Bank’s behavior rule when establishing their expectations. To conclude, 
the Inflationary gaps put forward account for a high proportion of the long-term growth 
cycles in the four European countries studied.  
 
The credit market plays a striking role in financing European firms’ activities. European 
economies are now characterized by strengthened market capitalization, a growing banking 
sector and enhanced financial intermediation. This financialization movement is nonetheless 
followed by low inflationary pressures. Do expectations as to inflation remain relevant when 
economic agents are facing financial instability? 
 
Our results show that, according to K. Wicksell’s intuition, a fall in the money market rate 
constitutes a leading signal for long-term economic fluctuations. Nevertheless, there is a 
strong need to enhance our definition of agents’ expectations in the face of uncertainty, taking 
into account the striking influence of real asset prices in our economies.  
 
 
 16
REFERENCES 
 
ARTIS, MARCELLINO AND PROIETTI (2003), “Dating the Euro Area Business Cycle”, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, DP 3696.  
BENTOGLIO, FAYOLLE AND LEMOINE  
- (2002), “ La croissance économique européenne perturbée par un cycle de courte 
période”, Economie et Statistique N° 359 – 360, p 83-100. 
- (2001), “Unité ou Pluralité du cycle économique européen”, OFCE Review 78, p 9-73. 
BLAUG (1999), “La pensée économique”, 5ème édition, translation of  “Economic Theory in 
Retrospect”, Alain and Christiane ALCOUFFE, Economica. 
BOUTHEVILLAIN (2002), “Filtre de Hodrick Prescott et choix de la valeur du paramètre 
λ  ”, Notes d’Etudes et de Recherche 89, “PIB potentiel et écart de PIB: quelques 
évaluations pour la France”, Banque de France, p 1-21 
BOIANOVSKY AND TRAUTWEIN (2001), “Wicksell’s Lecture Note on Economic Crises 
1902/05”, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics vol. 12, I.3, pp. 343-66. 
EICHENGREEN AND MITCHENER (2003), “The Great Depression as a Credit Boom Gone 
Wrong”, Conference at the Bank for International Settlements. 
GREENE (2000), “Econometric Analysis”, Fourth Edition, PHIPE, Prentice Hall. 
HAGEMANN (2001), “Wicksell’s New Theory of Crises: An Introduction”, Structural 
Change and Economic Dynamics vol. 12, I.3, pp. 331-34 
HODRICK AND PRESCOTT (1980), “Post War US Business Cycles: An empirical 
Investigation, Discussion Paper”, Carnegie - Melon University, N°451. 
MÉSONNIER  
- (2005), “L’orientation de la politique monétaire à l’aune du ‘taux d’intérêt naturel’: une 
application à la zone euro ”, Bulletin de la Banque de France, n°136, avril. 
- And Rennes (2004), “Règle de Taylor et politique monétaire dans la zone euro”, Note 
d’études et de recherche 117, Banque de France.  
MISES (VON) (1912), “Theory of Money and Credit First”, Traduced by H. E. Batson. 
Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1981. 
NERLOVE (1956), “Estimates of supply of selected agricultural commodities”, Journal of 
Farm Economics, 38, pp. 496-509. 
PARNAUDEAU (2007), “Financialization of European Economies”, Conference at the 
European University Institute of Florence on May 25-26, 2007, “Financial Institutions, 
markets and ethics: Mixed approaches in the European context” 
 17
WICKSELL 
- (1898), “Geldzins und Güterpreise. Eine Untersuchung über den Tauschwert des Geldes 
bestimmenden Ursachen“, Gustav Fisher, Jena. English translation in 1936 and 1965, 
Interest and Prices, Macmillan, London. 
- (1907)-a , “Krisernas Gâta”, Statsokonomisk Tidskrift 21. English translation in 1965 The 
Enigma of Business Cycles, printed with Interest and Prices, Augustus Kelley New York, 
pp. 221-239. 
- (1907)-b, “The Influence of the Rate of Interest on Prices”, Economic Journal XVII, pp. 
213-220. Read before the Economic Section of the British Association, 1906. 
- (1908), “Ekonomika Kriser”, Unpublished Manuscript, Lund, Translated and published in 
1997, Knut Wicksell , Selected Essays in Economics, vol. 1, Bo Sandelin, Routledge, 
London. 
- (2001), “A New Theory of Crises”, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics vol. 12, 
I.3, pp. 335-42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
